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Notes
Batson v. Kentucky: The New and Improved
Peremptory Challenge
The Supreme Court decision in Batson v. Kentucky1 promises to
have a profound and positive effect on jury selection in criminal trials. In
Batson, the Court addressed the racially discriminatory use of peremp-
tory challenges for the first time since 1965. The Batson decision applies
modem equal protection analysis to the prosecutor's use of the peremp-
tory challenge to exclude members of the defendant's race from his jury,
and sets up a new standard by which the defendant may make a claim of
purposeful discrimination.
Until Batson, a defendant had to prove systematic and consistent
exclusion of potential jurors because of their race.2 This requirement was
understood by the Batson Court to mean, for example, that the prosecu-
tor must have consistently excluded every black juror in a black defend-
ant's trial before the Court would invalidate the prosecutor's action
under the equal protection clause.3 In practice, therefore, the prosecutor
was almost completely free to exclude jurors who shared the defendant's
race without constitutional scrutiny.
Batson drastically changes the framework for analyzing the prosecu-
tor's exercise of peremptory challenges. The Court held that a defendant
could establish a prima facie case of purposeful racial discrimination
solely by evidence of the prosecutor's actions at his trial. The Batson test
requires the defendant to show that he is a member of a cognizable racial
group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to
remove members of that group. The defendant must further show that
the facts and other relevant circumstances raise an inference of exclusion
based on race. If he does raise such an inference, the burden of persua-
sion will shift and the trial court will require the prosecutor to come
forward with a racially neutral reason for the challenges. 4
Because the peremptory challenge is not a constitutional right, the
Batson Court appropriately curtailed its use despite the fact that its role
as a tool for selecting an impartial jury is now more limited. By limiting
1. 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).
2. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 227 (1965).
3. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1720 & n.17.
4. Id. at 1722-24.
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the use of the peremptory challenge, the Court has necessarily changed
the meaning of the challenge. No longer truly "peremptory," the chal-
lenge is now limited to constitutionally permissible uses.
The Batson test leaves some questions unanswered, and does not
provide complete protection to a defendant against discriminatory jury
selection. The first problem with the decision is its apparently limited
application to instances in which the defendant and the challenged jurors
are of the same race. Consequently, instances in which the juror does not
share the defendant's race, but is nevertheless excluded for impermissible
racial reasons, would escape scrutiny under Batson. Such a limitation
undercuts the basic principle underlying the decision; according to the
Court, not a single instance of purposeful discrimination should escape
equal protection scrutiny. Second, this requirement also apparently lim-
its standing to racial minority defendants since the defendant must be-
long to a cognizable racial group, while ignoring the problem of
discrimination against jurors who because of their race are denied service
in a trial not involving a minority defendant. Finally, the decision leaves
many unanswered questions regarding the appropriate implementation of
the rule. This Comment proposes an interpretation of the decision that
gives full effect to the reasoning and purpose of the holding and the un-
derlying constitutional doctrine.
Section I briefly describes jury selection procedures in criminal trials
and traces the history of the peremptory challenge. Discussion of the
purpose of the challenge in criminal trials today provides a basis for un-
derstanding the limitations imposed by Batson.
Section II summarizes the constitutional doctrines affecting the use
of the peremptory challenge as applied before the Batson decision. Part
A discusses the previous minimal protection from discriminatory use of
the challenge provided under the equal protection clause. Part B ad-
dresses limitations placed on the challenge under the sixth amendment
guarantee of an impartial jury.
Section III presents the Batson decision itself. Section IV focuses on
the rationale supporting the decision and how Batson fits into modem
equal protection analysis. Section V addresses the logical inconsistencies
and the questions the Court failed to answer. The Comment concludes
by suggesting appropriate responses by trial and appellate courts to equal
protection claims raised because of the prosecutor's racially discrimina-
tory use of the peremptory challenge.
I. Understanding the Peremptory Challenge
This section analyzes the function, purpose, and history of the per-
emptory challenge. An understanding of the function of the peremptory
challenge in criminal trials provides the initial basis for analyzing Batson.
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A later discussion examines the challenge in light of its purpose and long
history in criminal procedure.
A. Jury Selection Procedures
Jury selection in criminal trials typically proceeds in several stages. 5
First, a list of prospective jurors is compiled, usually from voter registra-
tion lists. Theoretically, this group of prospective jurors represents a
cross-section of the community in which the defendant is to be tried.
Next, the attorneys or the judge,6 depending on the jurisdiction, question
the prospective jurors to disclose bias about the case that could threaten
the juror's impartiality.7 It is during this process, known as voir dire, 8
that cause and peremptory challenges are exercised. Challenges for
cause are unlimited in number and may be exercised only when the po-
tential juror shows a specific or relevant nonspecific bias.9
Peremptory challenges, however, do not require a showing of spe-
cific or relevant nonspecific bias. They are limited in number depending
on the crime charged, with more challenges allowed as the seriousness of
the crime increases. A party uses peremptory challenges as a strategic
method for obtaining a jury more sympathetic to its position, or at least
not sympathetic to the opposition. 0 Peremptory challenges most often
are used when the attorney suspects that a potential juror cannot be im-
partial, but cannot prove a basis for the exercise of a challenge for
cause. 
1
In the typical jury selection system, after an individual juror is ques-
tioned, the attorneys challenge for cause or exercise a peremptory chal-
lenge before moving on to the next juror. Under this system, an attorney
must use peremptories carefully, in case the challenged juror is replaced
with an even less desirable juror who also cannot be successfully chal-
lenged for cause. In contrast, under the "struck" jury system employed
in some jurisdictions, the cause challenges are used first, leaving a group
of jurors equal to the number of jurors necessary (usually twelve) plus
the number of peremptory challenges available to both sides. The per-
5. See J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMIT-
MENT TO REPRESENTATIVE JURY PANELS 85-175 (1977).
6. See, ag., FED. R. CRIM. P. 24.
7. See infra note 22.
8. Voir dire tranlates to mean "to speak the truth." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1412
(5th ed. 1979).
9. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 5, at 140-45. A specific bias may arise from a relationship
with the defendant, the prosecutor, or witnesses, or from a preconceived opinion as to the
defendant's guilt. A relevant nonspecific bias would arise, for example, from strong character-
istics of the juror relating to a particular race or religion, where race or religion is significant in
the case to be tried.
10. Id. at 145-47; see also R. WENKE, THE ART OF SELECTING A JURY 46-50 (1979).
11. S. Salzburg & M. Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash Between Impartiality
and Group Representation, 41 MD. L. REv. 337, 340-41 (1982).
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emptory strikes may then be used to eliminate those persons undesirable
to either side, allowing each attorney to manipulate the composition of
the jury with knowledge of who will remain after the peremptories are
exercised. Thus, each side will first examine all potential jurors for cause
and then choose the most desirable of the remaining pool of jurors by
exercising all its peremptory challenges at once against those it feels are
less favorable to its side.12
Under either system, the potential for racially discriminatory abuse
of the peremptory challenge was essentially uncontrolled until the Batson
decision. A brief review of the historical origin and purpose of the chal-
lenge system, and its purpose today, provide a basis for understanding
the import of Batson.
B. History of the Peremptory Challenge
Early English history of the peremptory challenge shows that its
original purpose was to satisfy the defendant.13 Since 1305, the Crown
has been required to show cause for every challenge. 14 Defendants, how-
ever, have retained "an arbitrary and capricious species of challenge to a
certain number of jurors, without showing any cause at all, which is
called a peremptory challenge: a provision full of that tenderness and
humanity to prisoners, for which our English laws are justly famous." 15
The American states accepted the defendant's peremptory challenge
as part of the common law. 16 By the nineteenth century, prosecutorial
peremptory challenges became common in the states. 17 In an opinion by
Justice Field, the United States Supreme Court upheld the prosecutor's
use of peremptory challenges, defending it as necessary to secure compe-
12. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 5, at 146-47.
13. See generally id. at 146-150 (early history of English jury selection).
14. Early English juries were chosen by the Crown, which had an unlimited number of
challenges. This unlimited right was withdrawn in 33 Edw. 1, ch. 2 (1305) (current version at
The Juries Act, 1825, 6 Geo. 4, ch. 50, § 29). The Crown later acquired the right to "stand
aside" an unlimited number of potential jurors until the panel was exhausted. "Standing
aside" was similar to challenging peremptorily in that a reason did not need to be given, but
differed in that it did not guarantee that the particular juror would not be allowed to sit on the
jury. If 12 jurors did not remain after the defendant and the Crown had both stood aside those
jurors they found objectionable, the potential jurors rejected by the Crown were recalled to
serve on the jury, unless the Crown could show cause. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 5, at 146-50.
15. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *353.
16. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 5, at 148-49. Some states protested the practice of "stand-
ing aside" and denied the government any challenges to jurors other than for cause, while
others allowed "standing aside" or a limited number of peremptory challenges. Congress
granted peremptory challenges to defendants in federal courts in the Act of Apr. 30, 1790,
§ 30, 1 Stat. 112, 119 (current version at FED. R. CRIM. P. 24), but did not mention the
prosecution's right to peremptories. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court determined that
the practice of "standing aside" was part of the common law, and hence was the law in the
United States. United States v. Marchant, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 480, 483 (1827).
17. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 5, at 150.
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tent and impartial jurors.18
Thus, what originated in 1305 primarily as the defendant's weapon
against the sometimes overzealous state became a system of challenges
for attaining an impartial jury for both the defense and the prosecution. 19
And so, until the Batson decision, the system operated by giving both the
defendant and the prosecution the right to challenge potential jurors
"without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to
the court's control."20
C. Purpose of the Peremptory Challenge
Even though the peremptory challenge is not constitutionally re-
quired,21 the Supreme Court has long recognized that it serves an impor-
tant function: the challenge is widely accepted as an essential means for
achieving an "impartial" jury.22 In this regard, the challenge not only
furthers the ideal that a jury should be fair and impartial, but also helps
to give the appearance of impartiality to the defendant.23 Under this ra-
tionale, because the peremptory challenge allows the defendant to
"choose" his jury, he should accept the verdict as impartial, fair, and
just, whatever the outcome may be.24
The peremptory challenge also allows attorneys to avoid the explicit
expression of "what we dare not say but know is true more often than
not."25 It prevents public expression of class and group bias, both of
which play an essential role in the selection of jurors. For example, at-
18. Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70-71 (1887).
19. See Comment, A Constitutional Blueprint for the Perpetuation of the All- White Jury,
52 VA. L. REv. 1157, 1172-73 (1966). The Comment questions whether the practice of
"standing aside" should be equated with the right to peremptory challenges, as Justice White
appeared to do in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 213 (1965).
20. Swain, 380 U.S. at 220.
21. First stated in Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919), the proposition that
the challenge is not a constitutional requirement has never been questioned. Batson, 106 S. Ct.
at 1720; Swain, 380 U.S. at 219.
22. "Impartial" can have many meanings in the jury trial context. To Lord Coke, an
impartial juror was "indifferent," 1 COKE, COMMENTARIES UPON LITTLETON *§ 155b, a
meaning adopted by the Supreme Court. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1960). But this
must mean that the juror is indifferent toward conviction or acquittal of the defendant in the
particular case, because it is imposssible to find 12 jurors who have no opinions that will influ-
ence their decision. Procedures that assure a "fair possibility for obtaining a representative
cross-section of the community," Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970), result in an
"impartial jury." See also Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 501-03 (1972) (jury selection proce-
dures must not create the appearance of bias); Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "'ts Wonderful
Power," 27 STAN. L. REv. 545, 550-51 (1975) (an impartial jury, drawn from a cross-section of
the community, assures that a range of biases and experiences will bear on the outcome of the
case).
23. Babcock, supra note 22, at 552.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 553-54.
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torneys regularly rely on factors such as occupation, economic status,
sex, age, and appearance, as well as race, when evaluating a potential
juror.26 But expression of these criteria in terms necessary for cause
challenges "would undercut our desire for a society in which all people
are judged as individuals. ' 27 The peremptory challenge is thus a nicety
for disguising socially unpopular prejudices, rationalized as a necessary
tool for choosing what appears to be a "fair" jury.
The peremptory challenge also supplements the more restricted
cause challenge, enabling the attorney to excuse a juror he suspects but
cannot prove to be biased. Probative questioning of a potential juror that
does not lead to a basis for a cause challenge may make the juror hostile
to the questioning attorney. The peremptory challenge allows the attor-
ney to dismiss such a hostile juror, thus permitting aggressive voir dire.28
II. Constitutional Doctrines: The Use of the Peremptory
Challenge Before Batson
Judicial limitations of the peremptory challenge have been constitu-
tionally based in the equal protection clause and the sixth amendment
guarantee of trial by an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the
community. Until Batson, however, limits under the equal protection
clause were negligible. Because the Supreme Court had failed to address
adequately the issue of racially discriminatory challenges, state and cir-
cuit courts attempted to provide greater protection to defendants under
sixth amendment principles.
A. Equal Protection Analysis
Until the Batson decision, the constitutional authority for challeng-
ing the racially discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge was
Swain v. Alabama.29 In Swain, the Supreme Court held that the equal
protection clause placed some limits on misuse of the challenge. These
limits were illusory, however, because the decision placed an insur-
mountable burden of proof on the defendant who challenged such
abuse. 30 Before discussing Swain, it is helpful to briefly review the gen-
eral fourteenth amendment equal protection doctrine as developed by the
Court.
The equal protection clause31 prohibits governmental acts that bur-
26. See R. WENKE, supra note 10, at 62-65.
27. Babcock, supra note 22, at 553.
28. Id. at 554-55.
29. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
30. See infra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
31. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment provides: "No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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den rights or deny benefits because of arbitrary classifications.3 2 If based
on race or national origin, a classification is termed "suspect" and will
be upheld only if that classification is necessary to achieve an end so
compelling that it justifies the limitation of fundamental constitutional
values.3 3 A law that fails the strict scrutiny test because of its application
in a particular case will not necessarily be stricken in its entirety; instead,
only the particular invidious outcome need be invalidated. Similarly, the
peremptory challenge need not necessarily be stricken in its entirety.
Rather, the particular impermissible use of the challenge may be de-
clared unconstitutional. Thus, the equal protection clause is a potentially
powerful tool for examining the results of racially discriminating uses of
peremptory challenges.
The most difficult aspect of challenging a particular governmental
action that may be racially discriminatory is proving that government
officers are applying the law differently to particular groups by classifying
members according to a "suspect" trait.34 Because it is very difficult to
ascertain whether the government official is using suspect criteria in his
appliction of the law, the Court has held that statistical proof is relevant
to determining the existence of discrimination on the basis of suspect
classifications. 35 Overwhelming statistical evidence showing dispropor-
tionate impact on a class may establish a prima facie case of unconstitu-
tional classification. Because the criteria used for selecting the jury pool
is often subjective, statistical evidence has been frequently used in jury
selection cases. 36 Jury selection procedures at the jury pool stage have
been held unconstitutional when the statistics showed racially dispropor-
tionate results or when the statistics indicated that the selectors were us-
32. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 521-
801 (3d abr. ed. 1986); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 991-1028 (1977). The
equal protection clause does not, however, deny the government the ability to "draw lines" to
classify persons; it guarantees only that such classifications will not be based on impermissible
criteria or arbitrarily burden a group of individuals. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
supra, at 525. When the law is applied in such a way as to create a class that is treated
differently, the Court analyzes whether such a classification violates the equal protection
clause. Id. at 526; L. TRIBE, supra, at 1025.
The classification may be invalid "on its face" or in its application. A classification is
invalid "on its face" when it expressly dictates that a group may not receive its benefits-for
example, a statute stating that only men may serve on juries. See, eg., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522, 523 (1975). A law invalid in its application is one that is applied in such a way that it
burdens a group, or denies benefits to it, on the basis of an impermissible criterion. See, e.g.,
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (law prohibiting wooden buildings for hand
laundries violated the equal protection clause because all Chinese persons owning such laun-
dries were forced to give up their laundry businesses, while all non-Chinese were exempted).
33. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 32, at 530.
34. Id. at 543.
35. Id. at 544; L. TRIBE, supra note 32, at 1026.
36. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 30, at 545.
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ing their discretion in a racially discriminatory manner.37
Before Batson, an equal protection claim of unconstitutional dis-
crimination through the use of the peremptory challenge required a great
deal of statistical proof. In Swain v. Alabama,38 an all white jury con-
victed the petitioner, a black man, of rape. Of the eight black persons on
the petit jury venire, two were exempt and six were struck by the prose-
cutor. The petitioner objected to the composition of the jury on three
theories, all based on equal protection principles:39 the selection of the
venire violated the principles of Strauder v. West Virginia;4° the prosecu-
tor purposely exercised the peremptory challenge in the petitioner's case
in a racially discriminatory manner; and the prosecutors in the county
had "consistently and systematically exercised their strikes to prevent
any and all Negroes on petit jury venires from serving on the petit
jury. ' 41 The Supreme Court rejected all three theories, refusing to invali-
date the prosecutor's use of the peremptory challenge. Pertinent to the
discussion of Batson is the rationale behind the second and third theories
addressed in Swain.
The history of the challenge system and its purpose of obtaining a
fair and impartial jury 42 provided the Court with a justification for deny-
ing Swain's claim of discrimination by the prosecutor. 43 The Swain
Court held that "[t]he presumption in any particular case must be that
the prosecutor is using the State's challenges to obtain a fair and impar-
tial jury,"44 and the presumption is not overcome by evidence of the
prosecutor's action at any particular trial. Apparently, the only conceiv-
able way to prove an allegation of discrimination under this standard
would be to obtain the prosecutor's admission that he had used the
strikes in a purposely discriminatory manner that was not aimed at
achieving a fair and impartial jury.45
The Swain Court agreed that the petitioner's third argument raised
37. Id. See, e.g., Castenada v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495-98 (1977); Alexander v. Louisi-
ana, 405 U.S. 625, 629-31 (1972); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550 (1967); Cassell v.
Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 284-87 (1950); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 403-04 (1942).
38. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
39. Swain, 380 U.S. at 223.
40. 100 U.S. 303 (1880). In Strauder, decided 11 years after ratification of the fourteenth
amendment, the Court invalidated a state statute excluding blacks from juries on the grounds
that the equal protection clause, which required that laws be the same for all persons, prohib-
ited discrimination against blacks because of their race. The Court accordingly proscribed
statutory exclusion of blacks from jury service as facially invalid because such statutes ex-
pressly denied blacks the right to serve on account of their race. The focus of the decision was
on the juror's right to be exempt from discrimination by the state based solely on race.
41. Swain, 380 U.S. at 223.
42. See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
43. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 209-22.
44. Id. at 222.
45. See State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1979). This appears to be the only
instance where a defendant used this technique successfully.
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a broader issue: Is systematic and consistent use of the challenge to re-
move black persons from the venire constitutional? The Court noted that
"when the prosecutor in a county, in case after case, whatever the cir-
cumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the victim may be, is re-
sponsible for the removal of Negroes... the purposes of the peremptory
challenge are being perverted. '46 Applying this standard, the Court con-
cluded that the record did not present a prima facie violation of the rule,
even though no black person had served on a petit jury in that county
since 1950, when record keeping first began.
Not surprisingly, commentary on Swain has been critical. Scholars
fit the decision into the equal protection framework by reasoning that
when there is an independent and legitimate reason for permitting a gov-
ernment officer to exercise discretion, the burden of proving discrimina-
tory purpose will be much greater.47 The Swain Court held that the
defendant must show clear and convincing proof of discriminatory pur-
pose before the peremptory challenge could be limited, because of its role
as an essential means of achieving an impartial jury.
Since Swain, numerous defendants have attempted to meet the test
of systematic exclusion, 48 but not surprisingly, almost all have invariably
failed.49 The heavy burden imposed by Swain left minority defendants in
many jurisdictions without hope of having any members of their race
sitting on their jury.50 The burden of proof was simply insurmountable.
B. Sixth Amendment Analysis
When Swain was decided, the Court had not yet incorporated the
sixth amendment right to an impartial jury51 into the guarantees of the
fourteenth amendment. However, the Court had previously recognized
that the very essence of the federal jury trial right was the right to a fair
trial by impartial and indifferent jurors.5 2 Four years after Swain, in
Duncan v. Louisiana, 53 the Court applied the sixth amendment jury trial
right to the states through the fourteenth amendment, and later made
clear that this protection included the right to a petit jury pool drawn
46. Swain, 380 U.S. at 223-24.
47. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 32, at 546.
48. See Annotation, Use of Peremptory Challenge to Exclude from Jury Persons Belonging
to a Class or Race, 79 A.L.R. 3d 14 (1977).
49. See State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1979) (the burden imposed by Swain
was met); State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979) (same).
50. See P. DIPERNA, JURIES ON TRIAL 174-76 (1984); J. VAN DYKE, supra note 5, 166-
67; Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. Rv. 235, 238-303 (1968);
Comment, supra note 19; Note, Peremptory Challenge--Systematic Exclusion of Prospective
Jurors on the Basis of Race, 39 MIss. L.J. 157 (1967).
5 1. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
52. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961).
53. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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from a representative cross-section of the community.54 Thus, the con-
stitutional guarantee of the right to trial by an impartial jury is applicable
to the states today.
On the one hand, if the actual purpose of the peremptory challenge
is to ensure that the jury is impartial, then the challenge would appear to
be an integral part of the jury trial right. 55 On the other hand, the per-
emptory challenge may actually subvert the goal of an impartial jury
when used to racially discriminate against a defendant, 56 and hence
under the sixth amendment should be limited to uses that are not based
on race. The Court has avoided any confrontation between the sixth
amendment guarantee of an impartial jury and the peremptory challenge,
although Batson presented a ripe opportunity for such an appraisal of
these apparently conflicting principles.
The circuit courts, feeling constrained to follow Swain in the equal
protection context, have instead addressed the issue of discriminatory use
of peremptory challenge under the sixth amendment.57 The Batson
Court expressed no view on the merits of the sixth amendment argument,
but the issue appears to be foreclosed by Lockhart v. McCree.58 In Lock-
hart, Justice Rehnquist indicated that the sixth amendment analysis does
not support a limitation on the peremptory challenge. Discussing
whether "death-qualifying" a jury conflicts with the sixth amendment
fair cross-section principles, he stated:
We have never invoked the fair cross-section principle to invalidate the
use of either for-cause or peremptory challenges to prospective jurors,
or to require petit juries, as opposed to jury panels or venires, to reflect
the composition of the community at large.... The limited scope of
the fair cross-section requirement is a direct and inevitable conse-
quence of the practical impossibility of providing each criminal defend-
ant with a truly 'representative' petit jury, . . . We remain convinced
54. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975).
55. Swain, 380 U.S. at 218-21.
56. See Note, The Case for Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials, 21
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 227, 230 (1986).
57. The Second Circuit was the first circuit to use the sixth amendment rationale for
limiting discriminatory challenges. McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984), cert
granted and vacated, 106 S. Ct. 3289 (1986). The Second Circuit followed California's lead in
People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978). The Sixth Circuit
followed the Second Circuit and agreed with McCray. Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762, (6th Cir.
1985), vacated sub nom, Michigan v. Booker, 106 S. Ct. 3289 (1986). However, the Fourth
and Eighth Circuits have rejected the sixth amendment rationale. United States v. Whitfield,
715 F.2d 145, 147 (4th Cir. 1983); United States v. Childress, 715 F.2d 1313 (8th Cir. 1983)(en
banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984). The Supreme Court vacated-both McCray and
Booker, remanding Booker to be decided in light of Allen v. Hardy, 106 S. Ct. 2878 (1986), and
Batson, and granting certiorari for McCray. The Court has again sidestepped the sixth amend-
ment issue, but it appears to reject implicitly the proposition that the cross-section requirement
extends to the selection of a petit jury.
58. 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
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that an extension of the fair cross-section requirement to petit juries
would be unworkable and unsound .... 59
Several states have struggled with Swain and emerged with protec-
tion for the defendant through state constitutional guarantees of a fair
and impartial jury. The leading state case in this area is People v.
Wheeler,60 which introduced the procedure for scrutinizing peremptory
challenge abuse that was eventually adopted in Batson. Although the
sixth amendment analysis on which Wheeler relied is not directly appli-
cable to the rationale in Batson, the standard and remedy introduced in
Wheeler are useful in examining the potential impact of Batson.
In Wheeler, the California Supreme Court used the impartial jury
concept from the sixth amendment to limit peremptory challenge abuse.
In the trial of two black defendants accused of murdering a caucasian
man, the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike every black
person from the jury. The court, basing its decision on the California
Constitution, held that the use of the peremptory challenge to remove
jurors solely because of alleged bias violates the right to an impartial
jury, because the jury must be drawn from a representative cross-section
of the community. 61 The court reasoned that a "cross-section" of the
community is an integral ingredient for an impartial jury, because the
"only practical way to achieve an overall impartiality is to encourage the
representation of a variety of such groups on the jury so that the respec-
tive biases of their members, to the extent they are antagonistic, will tend
to cancel each other out." 62
The Wheeler procedure for raising a prima facie claim first requires
that the defendant produce as complete a record as possible of the cir-
cumstances of the case. Second, the defendant must establish that the
prosecutor is excluding from the jury members of a "cognizable" group,
within the meaning of the representative cross-section rule. Third, he
must show from the totality of the circumstances of the case a strong
likelihood that the prospective jurors are being challenged because of
their race. If the defendant meets these requirements, the trial judge
must determine whether the defendant has raised a reasonable inference
of misuse of the peremptory challenge and, if so, the burden shifts to the
prosecutor to show that the challenges were not based solely on group
bias.6 3
The Wheeler approach has been adopted in similar form in Flor-
59. Id. at 1764-65 (citations omitted).
60. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
61. Id. at 276-77, 583 P.2d at 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902-03. Article I, § 16 of the
California Constitution does not explicitly guarantee trial by an impartial jury, but California
courts have long recognized that the right to an impartial jury is implicit in the California
Constitution. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 265, 583 P.2d at 757, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
62. Id. at 266-67, 583 P.2d at 755, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 896 (footnote omitted).
63. Id. at 280-82, 583 P.2d at 764-65, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905-06.
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ida, 64 Delaware, 65 and New Jersey. 66 While this approach has been criti-
cized,67 the procedure for checking prosecutorial abuse appears to be
manageable, at least in California. 68
III. Batson v. Kentucky
James Kirkland Batson, a black man, was convicted by an all white
jury in a Kentucky court of second degree burglary 'and receipt of stolen
goods. During voir dire, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to
excuse all four black persons on the venire.69 Before the jury was sworn,
defense counsel moved to discharge the jury on the grounds that the
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges violated Batson's sixth amend-
ment right to a jury drawn from a cross-section of the community and
his fourteenth amendment right to equal protection of the laws. The trial
judge denied the motion, reasoning that the cross-section requirement
does not apply to selection of the petit jury. On appeal, the Supreme
Court of Kentucky rejected Batson's constitutional claims, followed
Swain on the equal protection claim, and refused to extend cross-section
analysis to the petit jury.70
A. The Majority Opinion
The United States Supreme Court effectively overruled a portion of
Swain v. Alabama 7 and held that Batson had established a prima facie
violation of the equal protection clause. The Court remanded the case
64. State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984).
65. Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997 (Del. 1985).
66. State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508, 511 A.2d 1150 (1986). Although Gilmore was de-
cided after Batson, the New Jersey Supreme Court nevertheless provided additional protection
for the defendant under its state constitution.
67. An exhaustive discussion of the sixth amendment impartial jury and "cross-section"
analysis is beyond the scope of this Comment. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d
748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978), and State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508, 511 A.2d 1150 (1986), are
good sources for study of the issue. For commentary, see Doyel, In Search of a Remedy for the
Racially Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 38 OKLA. L. REV. 385 (1985); Massaro,
Peremptories or Peers? - Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine, Images, and Procedures, 64
N.C.L. REV. 501 (1986); Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash Between
Impartiality and Group Representation, 41 MD. L. REV. 337 (1982); Note, supra note 56.
68. People v. Hall, 35 Cal. 3d 161, 169-71,672 P.2d 854, 859-60, 197 Cal. Rptr. 71, 76-77
(1983).
69. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1715. Kentucky follows a form of the struck jury system, in
which the parties exercise their peremptory challenges simultaneously by striking names from
a list of qualified jurors. KY. R. CRIM. P. §§ 9.36, 9.38, 9.40 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1983).
70. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1715.
71. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). The majority never expressly overruled Swain v. Alabama, but
Justice White, in his concurring opinion, stated that the majority was "overturning the princi-
ple holding in Swain" by allowing a constitutional challenge by Batson in these circumstances.
White agreed with the majority's ruling, however, because he believed Swain should be over-
ruled. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1725 n.71 (White, J., concurring).
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for a hearing in which the prosecutor would be required to give neutral
reasons for challenging the black persons. If the prosecutor could not
provide such reasons, Batson's conviction would be reversed.72
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, emphasized the principle
first articulated in Strauder v. West Virginia:73 "[T]he State denies a
black defendant equal protection.., when it puts him on trial before a
jury from which members of his race have been purposely excluded." 74
Recognizing that the defendant does not have a right to a jury composed
of persons of any particular race, Justice Powell insisted that the equal
protection clause guarantees the defendant the right to be tried by a jury
selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria. 75
The Court noted that the same rationale underlying attacks on the
discriminatory procedures used in venire selection similarly invalidated
discriminatory peremptory challenges, because the Constitution prohib-
its all forms of purposeful racial discrimination in the selection of jurors.
Purposeful racial discrimination, the Court reasoned, denies the defend-
ant the protection a jury trial was intended to secure-the right to be
tried by peers, indifferently chosen. In addition, by allowing the exclu-
sion of a juror because of his race, the state also unconstitutionally dis-
criminates against the excluded juror.76
Recognizing that the principles announced in Strauder had never
been questioned, Justice Powell focused on the evidentiary burden re-
quired of a defendant making a claim of purposeful discrimination. He
pointed out that the Swain Court attempted to protect the peremptory
nature of the challenge because of its importance as a means of achieving
a qualified and unbiased jury. Relying on the presumption that the pros-
ecutor had properly exercised the state's challenges, Justice Powell rec-
ognized, however, that the equal protection clause placed some limits on
the right to challenge. 77 Because the lower courts interpreted Swain to
require proof of repeated exclusion of a particular minority over a
number of cases, the Court found that the prosecutor was virtually im-
mune from constitutional scrutiny under the equal protection clause. As
a result, the Court rejected the heavy evidentiary burden placed on the
defendant under the Swain rationale as inconsistent with the "strict scru-
tiny" equal protection standards developed since Swain.
The Batson requirements for proving discriminatory purpose in the
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges parallel those articulated in
the cases addressing discriminatory purpose in the selection of the ve-
72. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1725.
73. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
74. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1716. "Exclusion of black persons from service as jurors consti-
tutes a primary example of the evil the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to cure." Id.
75. Id. at 1716-17.
76. Id. at 1717-18.
77. Id. at 1719-20.
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nire.78 Thus, the new standard allows the defendant to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination solely on evidence of the prosecutor's action
at his trial.79 The Court very clearly stated the evidentiary burden the
defendant must carry:
To establish such a case, the defendant must show that he is a member
of a cognizable racial group and that the prosecutor has exercised per-
emptory challenges to remove.., members of [his] race... Finally,
the defendant must show that these facts and ... other relevant cir-
cumstances raise an inference [of exclusion on account of race].80
In explaining the requisite standard of proof, the Court emphasized
that the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances. After the
defendant has established a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the
burden shifts to the state to give a neutral explanation for its challenges.
The trial court must then determine if the circumstances warrant a find-
ing of purposeful discrimination. In response to the dissenters' criticism,
Justice Powell stated that this decision will not undermine the useful-
ness of the challenge, but will be enforceable and practical, and will
strengthen the perception of fairness in the criminal justice system.81
B. The Concurring Opinions
Justice White, who had voted with the majority in Swain, concurred
with the majority in Batson. He explained his reversal in position from
Swain by noting the continued widespread use of the peremptory chal-
lenge for racial discriminatory purposes, despite Swain's warning that the
equal protection clause limits such discrimination by the states. How-
ever, he pointed out that "[m]uch litigation will be required to spell out
the contours of the Court's Equal Protection holding .... "82
Justice Marshall also concurred with the majority, but advocated a
stronger remedy; he would ban peremptory challenges altogether in
criminal trials. Finding that the majority's remedy would only address
flagrant instances of discrimination, he stated that "[t]he inherent poten-
tial of peremptory challenges to distort the jury process by permitting the
exclusion of jurors on racial grounds should ideally lead the Court to
abolish them entirely from the criminal justice system. ' 83 Because the
majority opinion gives no guidence to the trial judge on how to assess the
prosecutor's motives, Justice Marshall argued that the protection offered
to minority defendants is illusory because the prosecutor can easily gen-
erate permissible excuses. 84
78. Id. at 1721-24; e.g. Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494-95 (1977).
79. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1722-23.
80. Id. at 1723 (citations omitted).
81. Id. at 1723-24.
82. Id. at 1724-25 (White, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 1728 (Marshall, J., concurring).
84. Id. Justice Stevens' opinion, in which Justice Brennan joined, defended the decision
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C. The Dissenting Opinions
Chief Justice Burger dissented in an opinion joined by Justice Rehn-
quist.85 In addressing the merits, the Chief Justice emphasized the his-
tory and function of the peremptory challenge and criticized the
extension of venire pool exclusion rules to petit jury exclusion through
the peremptory challenge. 86 He stated that "unadulterated equal protec-
tion analysis is simply inapplicable to peremptory challenges exercised in
any particular case."'87 Pure equal protection analysis, he argued, would
require extension of the rule to exclusions based on sex, age, religious or
political affiliations, mental capacity, number of children, living arrange-
ments, and employment in a particular industry or profession. 88 In addi-
tion, he expressed concern that the holding could not logically be limited
to prosecutorial abuses,89 and would ultimately result in "juries that the
parties do not believe are truly impartial." 90
Finally, Justice Rehnquist's dissent, in which Chief Justice Burger
joined, added that "there is simply nothing 'unequal' about the State us-
ing its peremptory challenges to strike blacks from the jury in cases in-
volving black defendants, so long as such challenges are also used to
exclude whites in cases involving white defendants, Hispanics in cases
involving Hispanic defendants ... and so on." 91 Because the excluded
blacks are not denied the right to serve as jurors in cases involving non-
black defendants, he argued, neither the excluded blacks nor the commu-
nity is harmed. He saw nothing unconstitutional in using peremptory
challenges based on group affiliations or racial classification as a screen
for potential juror partiality, because the purpose of the peremptory chal-
lenge is to provide a method for attaining an unbiased jury. Justice
Rehnquist also opined that the use of the peremptory challenge to single
on equal protection grounds. Batson had argued that the sixth amendment should be the basis
for a limitation on the challenge, and he expressly declined to rely on the equal protection
clause in oral argument. Even though the petitioner did not argue the equal protection issue,
because the State of Kentucky had based its argument on adherence to Swain's equal protec-
tion holding, Stevens thought it proper for the Court to rule on that issue. Id. at 1729-30
(Stevens, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor also concurred separately, adding that, in her
opinion, Batson should apply only prospectively. Id. at 1731 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Bat-
son was given limited retroactive effect in Griffith v. Kentucky, 107 S. Ct. 708 (1987).
85. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1731 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Since the petitioner failed to
raise an equal protection claim, Chief Justice Burger argued that the majority mistakenly ruled
on that issue. Because of the importance of the issue, he felt that the equal protection decision
was premature, and would have at least directed reargument of the issue. Id. at 1731-34. For
the concurrence's response, see id. at 1729 (Stevens, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 1735-36 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 1737 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
88. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 1738 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 1740 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 1744 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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out members of a racial group does not "infringe upon any other consti-
tutional interests."'92
IV. Batson's Impact
Batson will have a practical impact on jury selection in criminal tri-
als involving defendants who are members of a racial minority. It will
require defense counsel to keep careful record of voir dire regarding pro-
spective jurors' races and to pay closer attention to prosecutorial chal-
lenges. It will also require sensitive scrutiny by the trial judge to
ascertain the motivation of both the prosecutor and the defense. Clearly,
Batson will provide a racial minority defendant an opportunity to be
tried by a jury on which other members of his race sit. Perhaps as signifi-
cant, minority racial groups will not be denied the right to participate in
criminal trials as jurors simply because of their race.
The Batson test conforms to current equal protection doctrine be-
cause it implicitly subjects a claim of purposeful racial discrimination in
the use of a peremptory challenge to the same strict scrutiny test as re-
quired in all other claims of such discrimination. Batson recognizes that
the constitutional rights of the defendant and the excluded juror out-
weigh the importance of allowing the government to have unchecked use
of the peremptory challenge. 93 Since "clear and convincing" proof of
discriminatory purpose in this situation is all but impossible to meet,94
the Court accepted a lower standard of proof to raise a prima facie claim.
Nevertheless, Batson does not significantly alter the traditional pur-
poses and importance of the peremptory challenge in criminal trials. 95
Even as limited by Batson, the "new" challenge remains an important
means for achieving an impartial jury. It may still be used to strike ju-
rors on the basis of a hunch, an assumption, or an intuitive judgment.
The peremptory challenge may not, however, be used on the assumption
that because the juror shares the defendant's race he will not be able to
decide the case on the facts and the law.
One traditional purpose of the challenge was to permit strikes based
on socially unpopular expressions of bias. 96 Although that purpose still
may be acceptable after Batson, its use must square with the demands of
the equal protection clause. This limitation not only prohibits overt
92. Id. at 1745 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
93. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 32, at 546. "[Flew govern-
mental interests, other than a possible interest in protection of human life, could justify any use
of such [racial] classifications." Id. at 580 n. 119.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 46-50.
95. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text. Chief Justice Burger considers this a




manifestations of discrimination, but also extends to obscured, subjective
uses of the challenge by state officers. For example, when used to ex-
clude jurors on the basis of impermissible discrimination, the challenge is
not exempt from equal protection scrutiny simply because other permis-
sible uses of the challenge obscure that discriminatory use. When the
challenge is applied without any discriminatory motives, however, it may
still be used to exclude a juror whose occupation, economic status, sex,
age, or appearance, indicate that he might not be impartial.97
Historically, another purpose of the peremptory challenge was to
satisfy the defendant that his jury would be fair. The Batson decision
does not frustrate this goal since it does not limit the defendant's use of
the challenge. 98 Indeed, because this goal was the very foundation for
the challenge,99 it is imperative that the defendant's challenge remain
unfettered.
The final traditionally recognized purpose of the peremptory chal-
lenge was to act as a supplement to the cause challenge. °° Even after
Batson, a prosecutor may use a peremptory challenge to strike a particu-
lar juror, regardless of the juror's race, who has been alienated by the
prosecutor's questioning. Thus, vigorous voir dire remains an important
tool for attaining an impartial jury.
Notably, Batson is limited to claims that members of a racial minor-
ity have been impermissibly excluded. It does not apply to discrimina-
tion claims by members of other types of groups besides racial minorities,
a defect in the majority's reasoning charged by Chief Justice Burger in
his dissent. 101 However, the Batson test need not be extended to groups
classified by sex, age, and religious or political affiliations, for example,
because the equal protection clause does not require that the same level
of scutiny be applied to these classifications. When classifications by race
are challenged under the equal protection clause, the test is one of strict
scrutiny. The governmental interest in maintaining the classification will
be upheld only if it is compelling-for example, when the law aims to
97. See supra note 25-28.
98. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1718-19; see infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
100. See supra text accompanying note 28.
101. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1737 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see supra notes 86-90 and accom-
panying text. By limiting the holding to racial groups, the Court avoids the arguments raised
against state court decisions based on the right to trial by a jury drawn from a cross-section of
the community. When the exclusion of potential jurors is based on the cross-section argument,
the exclusion of any "cognizable," People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 276-78, 583 P.2d 748,
761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 902-03 (1978) or "discrete," Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass.
461, 487-88, 387 N.E.2d 499, 15-16 (1979), cert. denied sub noma. Massachusetts v. Soares, 444
U.S. 881 (1979), group cannot be limited to racial minorities, but logically extends to group-
ings by sex, age, religious or political affiliations, and so forth. See Saltzburg & Powers, supra
note 67, at 363-64.
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protect human life.10 2 In contrast, the Court analyzes classifications
based on sex, age, and religious or political affiliation with a lesser degree
of scrutiny. For these groupings, the Court requires only that the classi-
fication have a "rational basis" or bears a "substantial relationship" to
the governmental end to be achieved by such classification.10 3 For exam-
ple, suppose a defendant claimed that young potential jurors were being
stricken by the prosecutor. Under an equal protection analysis, the
Court would ask only whether the prosecutor had a rational basis for
making such a challenge, because discrimination on the basis of age is
not "invidious" discrimination traditionally subject to strict scrutiny
under the equal protection clause.1 4 Of course, the Court could still
invalidate peremptory challenges based on age, gender, and religious or
political affiliation when these classifications do not bear even a rational
or substantial relationship to the governmental end to achieve an "impar-
tial" jury.
The Batson holding applies only to the prosecutorial use of the per-
emptory challenge in a racially discriminatory manner because equal
protection analysis applies only to the activites of the local, state, or fed-
eral government. It does not apply to actions by persons not connected
to the government. 10 5 Thus, the defendant may eliminate via the per-
emptory challenge all racial minorities without violating the fourteenth
amendment. States that limit the peremptory challenge based on the
right to an impartial jury under the sixth amendment, however, require
that both the prosecution's and the defendant's peremptory challenges be
limited when they are based on impermissible group bias.10 6 Because the
Batson holding applies an equal protection rather than a sixth amend-
102. See supra note 93.
103. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 32 at 530-33. Traditionally,
the Court used the "rational basis" test for classifications in economic legislation, while the
"strict scrutiny" test was applied to suspect classifications, those using race or national origin
as determinative of the allocation of burdens or benefits under the law. More recently the
Court has applied a middle level standard of review, requiring that some non-suspect classifica-
tions be "substantially related" to the purposes of the law. This test remains somewhat un-
clear, but appears to have been used in cases involving gender-based classifications, Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976), illegitimacy, Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978), and
alienage, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-24 (1982). The strict scrutiny test, however, is
applied only to classifications based on a trait that contravenes established constitutional prin-
ciples, and is most strictly applied in classifications based on race or national origin. This test
underlies the decisions in the jury selection line of cases from Strauder to Batson.
104. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 32, at 557 n.34.
105. Id. at 556.
106. Those courts limiting the defendant's use of peremptory challenges reason that the
state also has an implied right to a jury trial, which necessarily includes the right to an impar-
tial jury. E.g., People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 280-82 n.29, 583 P.2d 748, 764-65 n.29, 148
Cal. Rptr. 890, 905-07 n.29 (1978). Hence, limitations on the peremptory challenge based on
impartial jury principles apply equally to the defendant's use of the challenge. See Doyel,
supra note 67, at 443.
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ment analysis, it is more limited in scope than its counterparts in the
state systems. 107
To summarize, implicit in Batson is the Court's determination that
discrimination based on race is subject to strict scrutiny.108 Because
other classifications do not merit the same protection under the equal
protection clause, the Batson decision will not necessarily be extended to
them. Hence, Chief Justice Burger's criticism that the majority argu-
ment must extend to those groups is unfounded.10 9 Finally, the Batson
decision appropriately limits only the prosecutor's challenges, since the
equal protection clause applies only to governmental actions.
V. Post-Batson: Inconsistency and Uncertainty
The Batson decision improves the probability that a minority de-
fendant will have jurors of his race participate in deciding his fate. How-
ever, the prima facie requirements for an objection under Batson appear
to allow racial discrimination in some circumstances, despite the Court's
admonition that no invidious act of discrimination should be permitted.
This section examines these circumstances and proposes an interpreta-
tion of Batson that gives the fullest effect to the spirit of the decision.
A. Flaws in the Standard
There are two important flaws in the Batson standard. First, the
requirement that the defendant and the excluded juror be of the same
race unduly restricts the ability of the defendant to raise the inference of
impermissible discrimination. Second, that requirement may be inter-
preted as limiting standing to minority defendants.
By requiring that both the defendant and the impermissibly ex-
cluded jurors be of the same racial minority,110 unredressed discrimina-
tion could result. For example, if an Hispanic defendant raises an equal
protection argument alleging that all minority potential jurors were ex-
cluded by the prosecutor, in a case in which all of two blacks and two
Hispanics had been challenged in the selection of the defendant's jury,
only the challenges to the Hispanic members would be analyzed under
Batson. When the prosecutor excludes only two Hispanics and two
blacks, resulting in an all white jury, the pattern recognized under Batson
shows only two impermissible challenges to the two Hispanics, while the
total incidents of racial discrimination in this hypothetical case is actu-
107. Likewise, Batson supplies no support for limiting peremptory challenges in civil trials.
Attempts to limit either the defendant's challenges in criminal trials or either party's chal-
lenges in civil trials would have to be supported by impartial jury and cross-section arguments.
108. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1716-19.
109. Id. at 1737.
110. Id. at 1723.
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ally four (including the blacks).," A trial judge addressing only the
quantity of strikes against the defendant's racial group may well decide
that a prima facie showing is not made by so few strikes. In this case, not
only may the defendant be denied equal protection, although the statis-
tics indicate that the prosecutor is excluding all minorities, but the jurors
of other minorities could also be impermissibly excluded. Such a result is
difficult to square with the principle first recognized in Strauder v. West
Virginia 1 1 2 that denying a person participation in jury service because of
his race results in unconstitutional discrimination against the excluded
juror under the equal protection clause. Even though both the jurors'
and the defendant's rights may have been violated, under Batson the
defendant may not compel the prosecutor to explain his actions because
the number of questionable challenges alone may not be adequate to raise
an inference of discrimination.
Finally, Batson requires that to raise a claim of discrimination the
defendant must belong to a cognizable racial group. In an earlier deci-
sion in a venire selection case, Peters v. Kiff,11 3 the Court held that it is
unnecessary for the defendant to share the characteristics of jurors im-
permissibly excluded from the jury pool. In Peters, the Court stated,
"whatever his race, a criminal defendant has standing to challenge the
system used to select his grand or petit jury, on the ground that it arbi-
trarily excludes from service the members of any race. .... 1114 The
Court reasoned that "the exclusion from jury service of a substantial and
identifiable class of citizens has a potential impact that is too subtle and
too pervasive to admit of confinement to particular issues or particular
cases."115 Thus, in Peters a white defendant had standing to challenge
exclusion of blacks from the jury venire, and successfully did so. The
Peters holding was grounded in the sixth amendment right to an impar-
tial jury, but the reasoning appears equally persuasive in the peremptory
challenge context, where jury selection is limited on equal protection
grounds. In addition, if one of the main goals of Batson is to protect the
111. Compare State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (Ct. App. 1980) (challenge of
the only black, prospective juror is insufficient to raise an inference of improper use of the
peremptory challenge under a test substantially the same as that required by Batson for estab-
lishing a prima facie case) and Commonwealth v. Robinson, 382 Mass. 189, 195, 415 N.E.2d
805, 809-10 (1981) (no prima facie violation where defendant is black, prospective jurors in-
clude three blacks and one Puerto Rican, and prosecutor excludes one for cause and strikes the
remainder peremptorily, producing all-white jury).
112. 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1880).
113. 407 U.S. 493, 504 (1972); see also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526 (1975) (male
has standing to challenge jury from which females have been excluded); Annotation, Standing
of Criminal Defendant to Challenge, on Constitutional Grounds, Discriminatory Composition of
Federal Grand Jury Where Defendant is not a Member of Class Allegedly Excluded, 68 A.L.R.
FED. 175 (1974).
114. Peters, 407 U.S. at 504.
115. Id. at 503.
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excluded juror from invidious discrimination, then limiting the rule to
minority defendants does not serve that purpose in cases in which the
excluded jurors are not members of the defendant's race, or the defend-
ant himself is not a member of a minority race, but the excluded jurors
are. The motivation behind the holdings in the cases from Strauder to
Batson was to protect the jurors as well as the defendants from discrimi-
nation. When an impermissibly excluded juror has been denied his right
to participate in the legal system, however, he is not likely to challenge
the prosecutor's actions himself. Only by allowing the defendant to raise
the claim can the purposes of Strauder and Batson be achieved. To fully
protect both the jurors and the defendants, Batson should not be limited
to minority defendants.
B. The Evidentiary Burden under Batson
Batson reverses Swain in reaching the conclusion that the eviden-
tiary burden on the defendant may be met by introducing evidence of
purposeful racial discrimination in his case only.116 The Court's reason
for the departure from Swain was that "a consistent pattern of official
racial discrimination is not a necessary predicate to a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. A single invidiously discriminatory govern-
mental act is not immunized by the absence of such discrimination in the
making of other comparable decisions."117 Because a single act of invidi-
ous discrimination is violative of the equal protection clause, the defend-
ant can support a prima facie case of discrimination "solely on evidence
concerning the prosecutor's exercise of the peremptory challenges at the
defendant's trial."11 8
The same reasoning should apply to protect jurors who are excluded
because of their race. Batson attempts to "ensure that no citizen is dis-
qualified from jury service because of his race,"' 1 9 yet provides a stan-
dard that is not failsafe. For example, if the venire contains only one
black person who is peremptorily challenged by the prosecutor, the Bat-
son test for a prima facie violation could result in that challenge being
"immunized by the absence of such discrimination in the making of
other comparable decisions."' 20 The standard appears imperfect because
a single discriminatory challenge may slip through the cracks, since the
trial judge may not find a pattern that establishes a prima facie case of
discrimination. This shortcoming need not be fatal, however, because
the Batson reasoning, if applied with this potential problem in mind, can
116. See supra text accompanying note 43-45.
117. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1722 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 n.14 (1977)).
118. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1722-23.
119. I d at 1724.
120. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 n.14 (1977).
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be interpreted broadly enough to protect against even a single misuse of
the prosecutor's challenge based on race.121
Justice White predicts that much litigation will follow to spell out
the contours of Batson. 122 Much of this litigation likely will focus on
how far the standard should be extended to protect the defendant and the
juror from even a single invidious act contravening the requirements of
the equal protection clause. The remainder of this Comment focuses on
how trial and appellate courts should apply the Batson standard to best
effectuate its spirit, suggesting a liberal attitude toward the defendant's
burden and a strict attitude toward the prosecutor's rebuttal.
1. What Constitutes a Prima Facie Case?
Batson allows the defendant to establish a case of purposeful dis-
crimination solely on evidence derived from his case. He must first show
that he is a member of a cognizable racial group and that the prosecutor
has exercised peremptory challenges to remove members of his race from
the venire. This evidence is purely factual, and should pose no problems
if the proceedings are properly documented. 123 To achieve this docu-
mentation, voir dire must be recorded, objections to possibly impermissi-
ble strikes must be made in a timely manner, and the trial judge must
keep track of the race of all potential jurors challenged peremptorily by
the prosecution. If these steps are taken, the trial judge can make an
accurate assessment of the evidence, and the record will allow for mean-
ingful appellate review.
Batson also permits the defendant to show relevant circumstances
that raise an inference of discrimination by the prosecutor. 24 The Court
gives some illustrative examples of circumstances that would raise such
an inference: a pattern of strikes against black jurors, or the prosecutor's
questions and statements during voir dire and in the exercise of the chal-
lenge itself.125 Allowing the defendant to make that inference signifi-
cantly eases the prima facie burden of proving discrimination. Although
trial judges may be rightly concerned about the defensive use of such
claims for dilatory purposes, Batson requires that equal protection con-
cerns be given careful attention. Clearly, the Court intended that the
121. See infra notes 123-43 and accompanying text.
122. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1725 (White, J., concurring).
123. A few defendants seeking protection under Batson have already faced this require-
ment. See Williams v. State, 712 S.W.2d 835, 840 (Tex. 1986) (Batson analysis was foreclosed
because the defendant did not object to peremptory challenges immediately after they were
made); Bueno-Hernandez v. State, 724 P.2d 1132, 1133 (Wyo. 1986) (since voir dire was not
recorded and the only evidence regarding racially based challenges was that three of those
venire persons challenged had spanish surnames, no relief was granted).
124. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1723.
125. Id. The Court was quick to caution that "[t]hese examples are merely illustrative."
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trial judge should not place too great a burden of proof on the defendant
at this stage.
In cases in which the defendant has a significant amount of quantita-
tive evidence, the prima facie requirements will be easily met. For exam-
ple, in a case involving a black defendant and a white victim where the
prosecution challenges twelve of thirteen prospective black jurors, 126 the
inference is obvious from the statistical data alone. The inference is less
clear however, in a case in which the state peremptorily challenges all
black, prospective jurors so that the black defendant is tried by an all
white jury, but the crime involves a black victim.1 27 Similarly, other dif-
ficult cases will inevitably arise. What result when twenty-nine potential
jurors are questioned, four of whom are black, where three of those were
peremptorily stricken?128 When the only black prospective juror is
stricken, leaving an all white jury?129 Clearly the test is meaningful only
if courts apply qualitative as well as quantitative factors to identify racial
discrimination. It is therefore imperative that the trial judge find a prima
facie showing on minimal evidence of discrimination. To do otherwise
will probably foreclose reasonable inquiry into the defendant's claims,
and possibly "immunize" a single invidious act.130
Batson permits the prosecutor to rebut the prima facie showing. Re-
quiring an immediate response by the prosecutor to rebut the showing
seems to drastically curtail the "peremptory" nature of the challenge by
virtually requiring an explanation whenever the state challenges a minor-
ity juror in a case involving a defendant of the same race. But Batson
requires that the challenge be so limited because of the inherent danger of
its use to discriminate by race.13' Since even one instance of such dis-
crimination contravenes the equal protection clause, such a use must not
be allowed. Moreover, meaningful appellate review is impossible without
126. See Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 473, 387 N.E.2d 499, 508, cert. denied
sub nom. Massachusetts v. Soares, 444 U.S. 881 (1979).
127. See Commonwealth v. McKendrick, 356 Pa. Super. 64, 71-72, 514 A.2d 144, 150-51
(1986) (no prima facie case of discrimination found). Racial bias by jurors would appear to be
less problematic when the crime is not interracial; however, juror attitudes against minority
defendants do not necessarily correlate with the race of the victim. Trial lawyers are advised
that "[b]lacks tend to be... prodefendant in criminal trials, and sympathetic to the 'underdog'
.... Middle aged and younger [b]lacks tend to believe that the law and the police aren't
always right." R. WENKE, supra note 10, at 76.
128. People v. Clay, 153 Cal. App. 3d 433, 455, 200 Cal. Rptr. 269, 278-79 (1984) (prima
facie case established).
129. State v. Davis, 99 N.M. 522, 525, 660 P.2d 612, 615 (Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 99
N.M. 578, 661 P.2d 478 (1983); State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 488, 612 P.2d 716, 718 (Ct.
App. 1980) (no prima facie case established) (challenge of the only black venireperson not a
prima facie case, despite the fact that the prosecutor did not even question him).
130. This result would substantiate Justice Marshall's fears. See supra text accompanying
notes 83-84.
131. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1723-24 n.20.
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the prosecutor's response to the prima facie claim. 132 Thus a trial judge
should demand an explanation from the prosecutor in nearly every in-
stance in which a defendant objects to the challenge of even one member
of a minority race.
Appellate review of the trial court's decision should be necessarily
narrow under Batson. The trial court's determination of discrimination
is a question of fact, and "[s]ince the trial judge's findings... largely will
turn on evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give
those findings great deference." 133 The appellate court's ability to review
the circumstances of the case depends, of course, on the adequacy of the
record, but even when the record is complete, nuances in the proceedings
will be lost when reduced to writing. For example, when the trial court
fails to demand a rebuttal by the prosecutor, but the defendant has never-
theless made a prima facie showing, the reviewing court will be ham-
pered in its assessment of the prosecutor's purpose. In addition to
inquiring into the prosecutor's motives, the appellate court in such a case
must also consider whether the trial judge's decision itself was tainted by
racial bias or merely by misunderstanding the import of Batson.
Because the spirit of Batson attempts to prevent even one instance of
invidious racial discrimination, a reviewing court should remand the case
for fact finding if there is the slightest evidence of such discrimination for
which the trial court did not demand an explanation. The court required
this result in Batson itself, when the record quantitatively showed obvi-
ous discrimination and the trial judge failed to demand a response from
the prosecutor. But there are, however, closer cases, such as when the
reviewing court does not provide the defendant with a hearing on the
issue when the defendant merely showed that the only black had been
excluded, 134 or when both the defendant and the victim were black and
all black prospective jurors are stricken, resulting in a trial by an all
white jury.135 In such cases, where the numerical pattern does not give a
clear indication of race-neutral challenges, the trial court's failure to hold
a hearing on the issue warrants remand, despite the court's emphasis on
deference that must be afforded to the trial court's decision.
132. See infra text accompanying notes 134-136.
133. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1724 n.21.
134. State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 488-89, 612 P.2d 716, 718 (Ct. App. 1980).
135. Commonwealth v. McKendrick, 356 Pa. Super. 64, 71-72, 514 A.2d 144, 150-51
(1986). The appellate court relied on the trial court's assertion that "this was not a case in-
volving an interracial killing in which specific racial groups would be prone to take sides of
prejudice." Id. at 151. The appellate court applied the Batson standard, but should not have
based its decision on the trial judge's opinion of whether the prosecutor had any reason to
discriminate. It is the prosecutor's motives that are under scrutiny here, not merely the ap-
pearance of a fair trial. Accordingly, the defendant should have been granted a hearing at
which the prosecutor would be required to give racially neutral reasons for his peremptory
challenges of all the black potential jurors.
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2. What Rebuttal is Required of the Prosecutor?
Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing of purposeful ra-
cial discrimination, under Batson the burden shifts to the state to rebut
the allegation. Although the rebuttal need not rise to the level justifying
a cause challenge, 136 the prosecutor must justify the challenge on more
than the assumption that the juror could not be impartial because of his
race. The prosecutor must "articulate a neutral explanation" 137 that
must be "clear and reasonably specific" and "legitimate."' 138 From this
explanation, the trial judge must perform the difficult task of determining
the prosecutor's motives.
The experience in California, which uses a similar standard, pro-
vides some indication of how trial judges have treated the prosecutor's
rebuttal statement. In People v. Wheeler, 139 the California Supreme
Court stated that the prosecutor could rebut the inference of misuse of
the challenge by giving an explanation reasonably relevant to the particu-
lar case, its parties, or witnesses. The prosecutor would not rebut the
prima facie showing, however, if his justifications were merely "sham
excuses belatedly contrived to avoid admitting acts of group discrimina-
tion." 40 The court more fully explained the rebuttal requirement in the
later case of People v. Hall.'4' Reversing the lower court because it ac-
cepted the prosecutor's statements at face value, the Hall court rejected
the notion that the prosecutor shows impermissible bias only when he
declares an intent to exclude all members of an ethnic group. Thus, the
California Supreme Court requires the lower courts to make the determi-
nation of discrimination based on the circumstances, not merely on the
prosecutor's statement of his reasons. 142
Trial courts applying the Batson standard will face the same diffi-
culty when a prosecutor gives vague reasons for his challenges. Justice
Marshall considered this problem to be further proof that Batson will not
provide sufficient protection for the defendant.1' 3 If the judge applies
Batson properly, however, meaningful rebuttal will be required. To ac-
complish this goal the trial judge should note all the circumstances rele-
136. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
137. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1723.
138. Id. at 1723 n.2 (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
258 (1981)).
139. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, (1978); see supra notes 60-63 and
accompanying text.
140. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 282-83, 583 P.2d at 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
141. 35 Cal. 3d 161, 672 P.2d 854, 197 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1983).
142. Compare the statements proffered by the prosecutor in People v. Hall, 35 Cal. 3d 161,
165-66, 672 P.2d 854, 856, 197 Cal. Rptr. 71, 73-74 (1983) (prima facie case not rebutted),
with those set forth in People v. Clay, 153 Cal. App. 3d 433, 451-53, 200 Cal. Rptr. 269, 276-
77 (1984) (prima facie case rebutted).
143. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1728 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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vant to discrimination in the particular case, among other things keeping
a record of the prosecutor's questions of prospective jurors, and of which
jurors were retained and which were excluded. The adequacy of the
prosecutor's rebuttal to the discrimination claim will depend on the ques-
tions he has asked of all the venirepersons. Where the prosecutor lays an
adequate foundation for a peremptory challenge based on a hunch or an
intuitive judgment that the juror will not be fair to the state, his rebuttal
response to the trial judge should be accepted.
To demonstrate the standard, suppose, for example, that a prosecu-
tor asks generally whether any of the potential jurors will be influenced
by the fact that the case involves an interracial crime. The potential ju-
rors all respond that they will be able to try the case fairly. The prosecu-
tor then strikes all the blacks, but no whites, from the panel. If the
prosecutor attempts to rebut the defense's resulting discrimination claim
by stating that he believes that all the black jurors are now hostile to the
state, the trial judge should not accept such a response. By contrast, if
the prosecutor strikes only one or two of several potential black jurors
and justifies the exclusion by stating that those particular jurors seemed
to be alienated by his questioning, that response would be acceptable if
supported by some additional, objective fact. The trial court would
therefore require the prosecutor to show that the challenge was based on
some factor, other than race, that is indicative of partiality. In this situa-
tion, even if only one or two black potential jurors are challenged, the
judge should still demand a response if the defendant raises a claim under
Batson. Without a record of the rebuttal, meaningful decisions by the
trial judge and the appellate court are impossible.
C. Appropriate Remedy
Batson provides no guidance for the trial courts when the prosecutor
fails to rebut the prima facie showing of purposeful racial discrimina-
tion.144 The court may choose from three possible remedies: it may call
a new venire; it may bring in additional venirepersons of the same race as
those excluded to replace the improperly excluded jurors; or it may rein-
state the improperly excluded jurors.
The state courts that rely on impartial jury and fair cross-section
principles require discharge of the tainted venire, and replacement with a
new venire. Despite the cost in time and money, this route is necessary
because the venire is no longer representative of the community after
minority jurors have been stricken. 145 Equal protection principles do not
require such a step, because whether the jury is "representative of a
144. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1724 n.24.
145. A number of states require that the venire be dismissed and that jury be selected from
a new venire. See People v.Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 282, 583 P.2d 748, 765, 148 Cal. Rptr.
890, 906 (1978); Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997, 1013 (Del. 1985); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377
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cross-section of the community" is not in issue. Under equal protection
principles, the wrong to be remedied is the state's impermissible exclu-
sion of the juror because of his race.
The second alternative, bringing in additional venirepersons to re-
place those impermissibly excluded, is certainly less costly and time-con-
suming than choosing an entirely new venire. However this remedy does
not appear to be practical for three reasons. First, the. new, prospective
jurors are still subject to challenge for cause or peremptory challenges
that are not based on racially discriminatory motives. Moreover, the
new, prospective jurors may suspect that they are being brought into the
proceedings because of a racially discriminatory act, if it is obvious that
they were especially selected to join the existing group. Hence, these new
jurors may be hostile to the prosecutor. Finally, this alternative will not
completely satisfy equal protection demands because it will not remedy
the excluded juror's constitutional claims.
Because the state has violated the defendant's and the juror's consti-
tutional rights by applying the law in an invidiously discriminatory man-
ner, the thrust of Batson seems to require the third alternative remedy:
reinstatement of the excluded juror. The disadvantage of this alternative
is that the excluded juror may well suspect that the prosecutor attempted
to exclude him because of his race. Hence he may now be hostile to the
prosecution. Nonetheless, reinstatment is the best solution, even though
it may hamper the prosecutor's ability to mold the jury to her liking. If
the prosecutor knows that a challenge that cannot survive under Batson
will result in reinstatement of a potentially hostile juror, she will be more
careful in exercising her peremptory challenges. The import of the rule is
that state officers must be especially careful about conscious and uncon-
scious racial discrimination in jury selection. The specter of reseating the
impermissibly excluded juror provides sufficient inducement to refrain
from discrimintory practices, and thus is the best response to an imper-
missible challenge. By requiring this remedy, perhaps prosecutors will
view the price of racially based challenges as too great, even if a success-
ful equal protection challenge is not certain under Batson.
Conclusion
The peremptory challenge serves an important function in jury se-
lection today. It has been a part of the jury system for hundreds of years,
and the Supreme Court has been hesitant to tamper with it because of its
importance as a tool for selecting an impartial jury. Nevertheless, in Bat-
son the Court properly limited the prosecutor's ability to use the peremp-
Mass. 461, 491, 387 N.E.2d 499, 518, cert denied sub. nom. Massachusetts v. Soares, 444 U.S.
881 (1979); State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508, 539, 511 A.2d 1150, 1166-67 (1986).
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tory challenge, in accord with the demands of modem equal protection
analysis.
Batson will have a significant effect on the prosecutor's use of per-
emptory challenges. The decision comports with the developments in the
equal protection doctrine that have occurred since Swain v. Alabama,146
and is appropriately restricted to equal protection claims based on racial
discrimination. Likewise, its application to the prosecutor alone, and
not the defendant, is appropriate.
There are problems with the decision, however. First, it appears to
limit discriminatory claims to cases in which the defendant and the ex-
cluded jurors are of the same race, contrary to the principles of Strauder
v. West Virginia.147 Second, the decision requires that the defendant be-
long to a minority race, therefore failing to protect minority prospective
jurors against potential discrimination in cases in which the defendant is
white.
The other major problem with the decision is its vague standard,
which gives little direction to the lower courts. To carry out the spirit of
the decision, the trial court should require the defendant to make only a
minimal showing to establish a prima facie case, and also strictly scruti-
nize the prosecutor's rebuttal. Only when the prosecutor must give a
meaningful response to the defendant's objection does the appellate court
have an adequate basis to properly review the discrimination claim.
The goal of Batson is not to force the prosecutor to refrain from
using peremptory challenges. Rather, Batson seeks to stop invidious ra-
cial discrimination in criminal trials. Properly implemented, Batson will
encourage the proper use of the peremptory challenge in criminal trials,
and will increase society's perception of fairness in the criminal justice
system.
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